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Currency, conversation, and control: political discourse and the coinage in mid-
Tudor England. 
In 1551, stories began to circulate in England about sightings of a ‘strange coin’. The coin, 
which was said to depict a bear on one face and a ragged staff on the other, was rumoured to 
have been produced in a secret mint that the Earl of Warwick had established in Dudley 
Castle. The first recorded instance of this rumour comes from October 1551, when one 
Anthony Gyller of Coventry was sent to the Marshalsea on the charge that he had ‘spoken 
and bruted abrode sediciously that the Lorde Great Master had set up a coyning house at 
Dudley Castle, and that he had sene the newe coyne hym sellf, which was, he sayd, a ragged 
staff on thone side and a beares face on thother’. The day after Gyller’s arrest, a Yeoman of 
the Guard also reported that he had seen ‘a certain strange coyne with a ragged staff’ on it; he 
too was arrested and taken into custody.
1
 The day after that, two more men were sent to the 
Marshalsea ‘for a brute raysed of the aforenamed straunge coyne’.2 Although Anthony Gyller 
was released from prison in 1552, the rumour about the strange coin persisted; and in the 
same month, one Thomas Holland of Bath also claimed to have seen a shilling with ‘a ragged 
staff in it’.3  
The story of the ‘strange coin’ was not confined to the claims of these five men. It 
gained international currency when Jehan Scheyfve, Ambassador of the Holy Roman Empire 
to England, wrote his own account of it in a letter to the Imperial Court. Scheyfve noted that 
the rumour had arisen after a new coinage had been introduced in England, and that the 
rumour concerned the new silver shilling, commonly known as a ‘teston’. He reported that 
‘when the new testoons came out a murmur arose among the people that the said testoons 
bore the three bears staffs … instead of three lions’, and explained that ‘the blame for this 
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was fastened’ on Warwick because ‘he bears the three staffs in his arms’. Scheyfve then went 
on to describe how, in an attempt to quell these rumours, an official investigation had been 
carried out by the Privy Council. After conducting its inquiry, the Council announced that the 
confusion had arisen because the lions on the new shillings ‘were so disfigured that they 
looked like staffs’, and that therefore the rumours about the strange coins – and about 
Warwick’s secret mint – were false. However, although Scheyfve duly reported the Privy 
Council’s verdict, he concluded that the official explanation ‘looks even more suspicious than 
the other version’, adding that ‘the Council have as yet been unable to make the people 
believe it’.4 
In his account of the ‘strange coin’, Scheyfve described two versions of the same 
story – one a popular rumour and the other a government statement – and assessed these in 
terms of their relative credibility rather than their inherent truthfulness. He concluded that the 
rumour was more believable, and so had proved to be the enduring version. As Ethan Shagan 
has noted, rumours were successfully integrated into popular discourse when they were 
‘constructed out of elements already present, allowing people a new and legitimized way of 
saying things already on their minds’.5 In this case, the story of the ‘strange coin’ drew on 
several existing elements of discourse in mid-Tudor England. First, as Susan Brigden has 
pointed out, this was one of many rumours that circulated about Warwick during his time as 
Lord Protector. He was an unpopular figure, and ‘[s]uch was the suspicion of his government 
and his motives that … people found stories like this not in the least incredible’.6 Among the 
various rumours about Warwick, accusations of illicit coining cropped up on several 
occasions, especially around the time of Somerset’s fall when several of the Lords of the 
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Council were accused of making coins in the Tower.
7
 These rumours were particularly 
dangerous; coining was a mark of sovereignty, and the unlicensed production of money 
represented an infringement on royal prerogative. At the very least, the production of coins 
with non-royal symbols could be construed as a sign of excessive political ambition, 
especially during a royal minority.  
But the story of the ‘strange coin’ also tapped into another contentious strand of 
contemporary discourse. The rumour was not only about Warwick and his political 
ambitions; it also gave voice to popular dissatisfaction with the condition of the English 
coinage. The rumour formed part of a wider context in which mistrust of the coinage, and 
suspicion of the government’s motives in manipulating the currency, were well-established 
components of popular belief. Scheyfve noted that the Privy Council’s response to the 
rumour had been ‘suspicious’, and it is easy to see why; the Council had admitted that the 
coins being issued from the Royal Mints were of such poor quality that they were almost 
unrecognisable as legal currency. While this explanation may have absolved Warwick of the 
charge of secret minting, it would have done little to bolster confidence in the national 
coinage. In fact, it may only have legitimised people’s suspicions about the government’s 
manipulation of the currency for political ends.  
Complaints about the coinage were particularly marked in the mid-sixteenth century. 
In 1542, Henry VIII authorised the first of a series of debasements of the silver coinage that 
would come to be known as the ‘great debasement’. Between 1544 and 1551, the silver 
content of English coins was reduced by as much as five-sixths, and the recoinage of the 
silver extracted through this process made the crown a profit of £1.27 million.
8
 However, the 
circulation of base coins alongside fine coins prompted hoarding and culling, and good silver 
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currency became increasingly scarce. Debasement was a common practice among many early 
modern regimes, and England was not the only country to experience these kinds of changes.
9
 
But the debasement was accompanied by a period of political change and inflation,
10
 and for 
contemporary observers these phenomena were inextricably linked; currency manipulations 
authorised by the state were often held to blame for the disruptions experienced by ordinary 
people in their everyday lives, and the government faced growing levels of suspicion and 
mistrust. In an attempt to stabilise the situation, the debased coins were revalued by stages in 
the 1550s (with their face value lowered to more accurately reflect their intrinsic worth), but 
this only prompted further confusion about prices and rates. The coinage became the subject 
of a growing critical discourse, and governors feared that popular discontent threatened to 
spill over into riots and social unrest. For many contemporaries, the debased coinage was 
seen as one of the most pressing ills facing the commonwealth in the mid-sixteenth century. 
This article examines the discourses surrounding the coinage in this period, and maps 
these onto broader debates about matters of state and popular political agency in Tudor 
England. The coinage has traditionally been the reserve of economic and numismatic 
historians, many of whom have concentrated on the details of crown policy and mint 
management.
11
 But the crisis of the coinage had equally important political, social, and 
cultural dimensions. What mattered was not only what the crown did with the coinage, but 
what ordinary people thought and said about it, and how they reacted to changes in monetary 
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value and supply. Contemporaries recognised that the coinage had an impact at all levels of 
the social hierarchy, and that its manipulation had wide-ranging consequences. As the 
Council of Ireland wrote to the Privy Council in January 1552: 
 
‘We do consider that the baseness [of the coinage] cawseth vnyuersall darthe, 
encreaseth ydlenes, decayeth nobylitie (one of the pryncypall kayes of a common 
welthe) and bryngeth magistrates in contempte and hatred of the people, whereof 
muste nedes growe disobedience, And fynally with contynuance yt wilbe the dekaye 
and cawse of desolation of all Cyties and townes, from whens all Cyville and good 
orders sprange: and therby dothe chieffely contynue thoroughe the vnyuersall worlde 
where any Common welthe remayneth… Wherefore excepte remedye be given we 
see a playne demonstratyon of the subversion of the common welthe vnder the kinges 
domynyons’.12 
 
  
The task facing Tudor governors was not only to reform the coinage materially, but 
also to control how money was perceived, talked about, and used in everyday situations. 
Historians have long recognised that coins were an important medium for the display of royal 
propaganda: their wide circulation presented an opportunity for monarchs to shape their 
public image, and to determine what kinds of pictures, words, and symbols the people would 
associate with their reign.
13
 In this sense, coins represented royal authority, and any 
depreciation of the coinage could signify the decline of royal legitimacy: ‘if the royal portrait 
was what guaranteed the coin’s value or worth, decline in the market value of a coin might 
well also debase the royal brand and image, signs of royal authority’.14 Tudor governors were 
aware that the reputation of the coinage could be damaged not only through the material 
process of debasement, but also through the corrosive influence of rumour, gossip, and ill 
reputation.  
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Although in theory the coinage was a matter of state, and its value was decided by the 
crown alone, its circulation as currency meant that its exchange value was in practice subject 
to the vagaries of popular opinion. The valuation and estimation of coins was not simply 
decided by the monarch and marked in the mints, but was a process of negotiation that took 
place in the public sphere. This was entirely shaped by rumour, gossip, advice, conversation, 
and verbal exchange. People debated what coins were worth in the market place; they 
discussed rumours of debasement and revaluations; and they negotiated prices and values 
accordingly. Coins not only provided the stuff of popular rumours and gossip, but they 
featured in plays, poems, and literature, as well as treatises, correspondence, and government 
papers.
15
 The coinage was therefore represented and spoken about in ways that eluded the 
immediate control of the crown, despite its efforts at regulation.
16
  
An analysis of the discourses surrounding the coinage contributes to the existing 
historiography on popular political language in mid-Tudor England.
17
 As Andy Wood has 
noted, in the mid-sixteenth century the state became increasingly concerned about the 
‘assertive nature of popular political speech’ on a range of topics, including the sensitive 
matters of religion and social order.
18
 Attempts by the government to close down such debate 
and ‘fix’ meaning reflected ‘a fundamental crisis of legitimacy’ in the realm, stemming from 
the ‘inability of the mid-Tudor state to inspire sufficient commitment or respect’.19 The 
coinage, like religion, was something that was discussed and debated by ordinary people, and 
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popular opinions often ran contrary to official policy. Thus the Tudor regimes’ efforts to 
control this discourse and ‘fix’ the value of coins formed part of the broader crisis of 
legitimation and authority in mid-sixteenth century England. 
 
* 
 
Talking or writing about the coinage was a potentially dangerous activity in mid-Tudor 
England. The coinage was one of a group of topics ‘upon which the ordinary subject was 
supposed to be silent and even the discussions of insiders were supposed to be private (that is, 
restricted to an in-group of privileged participants and most certainly not for general 
consumption)’.20 Critically discussing the coinage amounted in effect to a criticism of the 
crown, and so could be classed as sedition or even treason. Because of this, texts and treatises 
on the debased coinage rarely appeared in print.
21
 Most analyses that have survived were 
produced and circulated in manuscript, and were intended for a controlled readership. They 
were mostly written by (and for) agents of the crown or government officials – but even for 
these insiders, the topic was still a risky one, and authors went to some lengths to ensure that 
their texts were not taken the wrong way.  
Thomas Smith’s Discourse of the common weal of this realm of England is perhaps 
the best known contemporary commentary on the debasement. Written in 1549, the 
Discourse consists of three dialogues in which five characters – a doctor, a knight, a 
husbandman, a capper, and a merchant – talk about the condition of the commonwealth and 
                                                          
20
 P. Lake, ‘The politics of “popularity” and the public sphere: the “monarchical republic” of Elizabeth I defends 
itself’, in P. Lake and S. Pincus, eds., The politics of the public sphere in early modern England (Manchester, 
2007), p. 59. 
21
 The opposite was the case in the currency crisis of the 1690s: see B. Waddell, ‘The politics of economic 
distress in the aftermath of the Glorious Revolution, 1689-1702’, English Historical Review, vol. 130 (2015), 
pp. 318-351, at pp. 329-331. 
8 
 
discuss remedies for its ills.
22
 The ‘basing or … corrupting of oure coine and treasure’ is 
identified by the Doctor as the ‘originall’ cause of a number of social and economic 
problems. He warns that it is ‘the cheife cause of all this dearth of thinges, and of the 
manifest imporishment of this Realme, and might in breife time be the distruction of the 
same, yf it be not the [rathere remedyede]’.23 However, Smith was aware that his critique of 
the coinage could be risky. The Doctor articulates this anxiety, reminding his audience that 
‘[i]t is daungerous to medle in the kinges mattiers, and specially yf it maie haue anie 
likelyhoode to minishe his profitte’.24  
Although Smith emphasised that the coinage was the reserve of the crown, he also 
highlighted the importance of popular opinion. The Doctor argues that although in theory the 
king had the right to alter the value of money in his realm, in practice such changes could not 
be made ‘to indure for anie space’, because people would not accept coins at a face value if 
this differed too far from their intrinsic worth.
25
 This was especially the case when it came to 
international trade, as foreign merchants would only want to exchange their goods for fine 
silver and not for base coins: thus a monarch could not exercise complete control over the 
currency unless ‘we weare in suche a countrie as Eutopia was imagined to be, that had no 
traffique with anie outwarde countrie’.26 The problem here was not the debased coinage in 
itself: rather, it was the perception of the coinage, and its estimation in a national and 
international context that mattered. It was the reputation of the currency, just as much as the 
materiality of the coins, that the government needed to address.  
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Smith’s contention that a good coinage was one of the key foundations of the 
commonwealth, and its corruption one of the chief causes of the decay of the commonwealth, 
was echoed by others. Robert Recorde, a doctor of physic and a mathematician, raised the 
problem of the debased coinage in print in the second edition of his mathematical treatise The 
ground of artes (1552).
27
 At the time of the first edition of this text, published in 1543, the 
debasement had only just been authorised and its effects had not yet been widely felt. By the 
second edition of 1552, however, this had changed, and so had Recorde’s situation. In the 
later 1540s he had become a mint official. He was appointed comptroller of the Royal Mint at 
Durham House, London, in December 1548 before being transferred to the Royal Mint at 
Bristol, and in May 1551 he was appointed surveyor of the new Royal Mint at Dublin.
28
 The 
second edition of The ground of artes followed these appointments, and marking Recorde’s 
transition from an ordinary subject into ‘a servant of the state who is deeply troubled with 
prevailing conditions’.29 
In his preface, addressed to Edward VI, Recorde observed that the statutes of the 
realm – such as those for measuring land, or for the assize of food and drink – had lately been 
‘corrupted’ and fallen into decay.30 He suggested that one reason for this was the debasement 
of the coinage: ‘some menne have written, that it is to doubtful a matter to execute those 
assises by those statutes, by reason they depend of the standerd of the coyne, whiche is 
muche chaunged frome the state of that tyme, whanne those statutes were made’.31 Like 
Smith, Recorde argued that the coinage was one of the foundational standards, or measures, 
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on which the commonwealth was built, and on which it relied for its good order and 
‘preservation’. Any changes to the standard of the coinage had a knock-on effect, throwing 
statutes and laws into confusion, and disrupting the entire social order.  
Despite raising the spectre of the debasement, however, Recorde did not go into any 
further detail about the coinage in his text. Instead, he concluded by signalling that although 
he had ‘some other’ thoughts on that point, these had been ‘omitted for just considerations till 
I may offer them fyrst unto your Majestie … for many thinges in theym are not to be 
published without your highnesse knowledge and approbation’. These ‘thinges’ were all to do 
with the coinage, ‘namely … all standerdes from one unce upwarde, with other mysteries of 
mynte matters, and also moste part of the varieties of coynes that have been currant in this 
your Majesties realme’.32 The fact that these subjects were considered too sensitive to publish 
without first being submitted to the king for approval highlights the potentially subversive 
implications of treating the coinage in a published text. As Shagan has noted, there was a 
discrepancy between ‘the sorts of critiques of the English Commonwealth allowable for elite 
intellectuals and the sorts of critiques allowable out-of-doors’: the topic of the coinage is a 
perfect example of the kind of critique that was not permissible for general discussion.
33
 
Treatises on the coinage were often addressed to the monarch, and presented in the 
form of useful advice rather than explicit critiques. The gentleman John Pryse wrote one such 
treatise for Mary I in 1553.
34
 Discussing Mary’s recent accession to the throne, Pryse noted 
that ‘amongst many other thynges’ the people hoped would be reformed under the new 
regime, ‘the[y] cheyffely hope for restytution of your graces coyne … So shulde the 
restytutyon therof be not onely to the greate weale and profytte of your grace and of your 
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whole realme, but also to the redresse of infynyte greves that growe in this realme by 
occasyon of the sayd coyne being abaced’.35 Like Smith, Pryse identified the debasement as 
‘the roote of many particular greves’, including ‘dearth of all thynges, rearynes of rentes, 
engrosyng of fermes, enclosures, contempte of your lawes, scarcenes of money, lacke of 
treasure, and … extreme impoverisshing of this … Realme’.36 By bringing these issues to the 
Queen’s attention, Pryse hoped that the new regime would restore the condition of the 
coinage and, in so doing, bring about a reform of the commonwealth. 
 Two years earlier, in 1551, William Thomas, a clerk of the Privy Council, wrote a 
manuscript treatise on the coinage for Edward VI.
37
 In the preamble to his treatise, Thomas 
assured Edward that his comments on the coinage were private, and intended for the king’s 
eyes only: ‘no creature lyving is or shalbe privie … to this’.38 Thomas emphasised that he 
was motivated by a desire to improve the commonwealth rather than by any personal 
concerns or complaints: ‘wheare in dede I was somewhat earnest for the reformacion of the 
coyne … trulie my zeale to my cuntrey did so pricke me that I coulde not forbeare to 
exclayme against the faulte, liek as for the redresse’.39 Like other writers Thomas suggested 
that the debasement was the cause of a number of economic problems and he warned that 
these would lead to the eventual decay of the commonwealth if left unchecked. However, 
these problems were not the only cause for concern, and nor were they understood to exist in 
isolation. Thomas suggested that one of the most significant issues that the government 
needed to address was the way in which the coinage was perceived by the people, and how it 
was understood and represented in popular discourse. He emphasised the importance of 
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shaping public opinion in order to ensure that the debasement did not lead to social unrest. ‘In 
myne opinion’, he wrote, ‘it appeareth that the peoples chiefest desire shall kendle (if it be 
not whoale already) and at leingth must nedes burne. ffor most commonly they feele and 
smart or they vndrestande … that of extreame necessitie this coyne must be reformed and that 
without delaye’.40 Thomas concluded that what was needed was not only to reform the 
coinage itself, but – as importantly – to restore its good reputation. 
Thomas’s insistence on managing public opinion by shaping what the people ‘feel’ 
and ‘understand’ draws attention to a widespread critical discourse on the coinage that 
existed outside treatises and government correpsondence. In his translation of Livy’s An 
argument wherin the apparaile of women is both reproued and defended (1551), Thomas 
confirmed that ‘the basenesse of our coyne’ is one of ‘the common talkes of these daies’.41 
The suggestion that the debasement was a popular talking point was also echoed by Smith in 
his Discourse. By putting his analysis into the mouths of five characters of different social 
sorts who carried out their conversation away from court or parliament, Smith made it clear 
that the coinage was a topic of general debate and conversation.
42
 However, although Smith 
and Thomas both alluded to a widespread discourse about the coinage, they were aware that 
to be seen to be engaging with or contributing to this discourse was an even more dangerous 
activity than writing about it. Thus although their texts pointed to the existence of a broader 
conversation on the coinage in which diverse members of the commonwealth participated, 
they did not claim to take any part in this themselves, and instead addressed their comments 
only to the crown.  
The circumspection of these writers was based in part on the recognition that speaking 
critically about the coinage was as dangerous, if not more so, than writing about it. The 
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implications of openly discussing the coinage may be seen in the example of Bishop Hugh 
Latimer, who was reportedly accused of being a ‘sedicious fellowe’ after referring to the 
debasement in two sermons of 1549. In a sermon at St Paul’s, Latimer had compared a new 
shilling to an ‘olde grote’, and complained that ‘the [fineness] of the siluer I can not se’.43 In 
a second sermon, he compared his comments about the new shilling with those of the Biblical 
prophet Eli, who had criticised Jerusalem for ‘meddling’ with its coinage. Ostensibly 
speaking as Eli addressing the citizens of Jerusalem, Latimer chided: ‘Thy syluer is turned, 
into ... drosse ... Thy siluer is drosse, it is not fine, it is counterfaite, thy siluer is turned’.44 
Latimer’s criticisms of the coinage were spoken at St Paul’s, in the hearing of his 
congregation (including the king).
45
 His sermons were then reproduced in print and made 
available for general distribution; this meant that his complaints about the government’s 
production of ‘counterfeit’ shillings were circulated both orally and textually, prompting the 
accusation of sedition.  
 
* 
 
The mid-Tudor period saw a marked increase in the government’s attempts to regulate 
people’s interactions with the coinage. In Henry VIII’s reign there had been relatively few 
royal proclamations about the coinage; between 1542 (when the first debasement was 
authorised) and 1547, only one related proclamation was issued.
46
 This changed notably from 
Edward VI’s reign, and between 1548 and 1565 a total of thirty-six proclamations were 
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issued that had to do specifically with the coinage (table 1). These included proclamations 
announcing devaluations, denouncing counterfeiters, setting out punishments for rumour-
mongers, and warning against all kinds of currency crime. The number of these 
proclamations can be put in some perspective when compared with other topical issues: in the 
same period there were seven royal proclamations about enclosures, six about vagabonds, and 
eight about unlicensed assemblies and gatherings. Given that the combined total of 
proclamations about these issues is lower than the number of proclamations about the 
coinage, it is clear that regulation of the currency was a pressing concern for the mid-Tudor 
regimes. 
  
15 
 
 
Year 
Proclamations 
about coinage 
Total 
proclamations 
% about coinage 
1547 0 22 0 
1548 1 20 5 
1549 4 37 11 
1550 2 14 14 
1551 7 15 47 
1552 0 3 0 
1553 1 13 8 
1554 4 23 17 
1555 0 5 0 
1556 4 7 57 
1557 0 5 0 
1558 0 15 0 
1559 1 16 6 
1560 4 12 33 
1561 3 11 27 
1562 3 12 25 
1563 0 18 0 
1564 0 14 0 
1565 2 10 20 
Total 36 272 13 
 
Table 1: Proclamations about coinage 1547-1565.
47
 
 
In 1551, seven out of a total of fifteen royal proclamations had to do with the coinage. This 
was due in large part to the government’s decision in that year to ‘call down’ some of the 
base coins in circulation. An announcement was made in April that shillings (known as 
testons) would be reduced in value from 12d to 9d, and groats from 4d to 3d.
48
 As C.E. 
Challis has noted, the devaluation of these coins formed part of a long-term plan to remove 
the base coinage from circulation, and replace it with coins of a fine silver standard.
49
 The 
devaluation was accordingly advertised in royal proclamations as an ‘amendment’ of the 
coinage that would eventually bring ‘great honour to this realm, and also a marvellous benefit 
                                                          
47
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48
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unto the whole commonwealth’.50 But the announcement was badly timed. The devaluation 
was publicised four months in advance of the date on which it was due to take effect, 
allowing rumours to circulate in the interim, and prompting widespread confusion about the 
value of coins. 
One consequence of this announcement was that prices were raised in anticipation of 
the coming fall. In London it was reported that merchants ‘sodainely raysed the prises of all 
things to a mervaylouse rekening’.51 A proclamation was issued in May blaming this inflation 
on rumour-mongers and other ‘naughty people’ who had ‘either wilfully or ignorantly … 
mistaken his majesty’s good meaning upon the former proclamation’.52 In July it was 
announced that anyone who invented or spread rumours about the devaluation of coins would 
be charged with imprisonment and a fine. If the fine could not be paid, then the offender 
would be placed on the public pillory and have one of their ears cut off. Again, rumour-
mongers were directly blamed: ‘now it is come to pass that by the spreading of false and 
untrue rumours the prices of all things are grown so excessively that it is intolerable … by 
reason that certain lewd persons of their own light heads have imagined that because his 
highness hath already somewhat abated the value of his … coin therefore his majesty should 
yet more abase it, and of their imaginations have uttered this fond rumour’.53 
Rather than quelling reports about further devaluations, however, this proclamation 
had the opposite effect, sparking ‘greate rumors that in all haste, and … prively, the Kinge 
and counsel was busye aboute the altering’ of the coinage.54 These rumours were in fact an 
accurate anticipation of the government’s plans. In August a proclamation was issued 
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announcing that shillings would be further reduced to 6d, just half their original value.
55
 
There are several reasons why this second ‘fall’ might have been correctly anticipated. One 
chronicler suggested that people were able to predict devaluations by observing the actions of 
Privy Councillors: ‘[s]ome saied that this talcke grewe by reason of som of the councell sent 
for their credytors and payed them when they loked not for yt. Some gathered yt because som 
of the ... councell sold muche plate’.56 Another explanation was offered by the gentleman 
John Pryse, who suggested that devaluations could be correctly predicted because ‘men of 
knowlege’ would realise what was happening and talk amongst themselves, with the ‘people 
hearing that… [and] therfore suspectyng an other fall’.57  
 Pryse’s suggestion that merchants were discussing the coinage and sharing their 
knowledge with their friends and colleagues is supported by other sources. Just days after the 
devaluation of 1551 was announced, merchant Anthony Cave wrote to John Johnson that 
‘here is a wonderffull sodden altercacion by calling the groott to ijd and so other congruently. 
I shall lose a good porcion by yt and manny others doo moche lament theyr losses’.58 He 
asked Johnson to find out more about what was happening with the coinage: ‘I pray youe if 
ye can her … what ye can for knowlege of owre old moneyes’.59 He also asked for advice as 
to how he could identify the ‘worst’ shillings and groats, in order to save the better ones for 
future use.
60
 Cave appears to have sought advice from a number of different sources: in a 
letter of November 1551, he thanked Johnson for his thoughts and added that ‘I percyve 
youre opinion of owre moneyes … differeth not partely ffrom others I have had’.61 This 
shows that information about the coinage was disseminated not only through royal 
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proclamations and official announcements, but also through correspondence networks and 
other channels of communication operating simultaneously. People were able to gather 
information about currency rates from several different places, as news about the coinage 
travelled quickly in line with – and in some cases anticipating – government policy, 
sometimes forcing the government to alter or abandon their original schedule. 
One further consequence of these rumours was that creditors were unwilling to accept 
debased coins for the payment of debts, as they feared that the money they received would 
soon be devalued. In January 1551, for instance, chapman Richard Shepparde purchased a 
length of white cloth from John Monoxe, a tanner, for the sum of £12, to be paid in July of 
that year. Shepparde claimed that he took £12 ‘of Currante money’ to Monoxe on the agreed 
date, but Monoxe refused to take the payment for the reason ‘that the kynges maiesties coyne 
was lyke very Shortly to be abacyd’. Soon thereafter the coin was in fact ‘dymynysshed’ by 
royal proclamation, and so Monoxe took Shepparde to court on an action of debt for the £12 
plus ‘the whole charge and losse’ arising from the recent devaluation.62  
Tracking down rumour-mongers caused problems for local governors, whose attempts 
at regulation often ended in frustration. In the summer of 1551, a rumour circulated at Sloley 
Fair that the government was intending to ‘call down’ shillings to the price of groats. 
Through a series of depositions taken from those who had heard or passed on the rumour, it is 
possible to see how a local bailiff attempted to trace the story to its source. Robert Esodde 
and John Brown, both tanners, reported that they had heard Reynold Thurston, another 
tanner, say ‘away with your shillings for I here say they were proclaimed at Norwich this day 
for a grote a pece’. Esodde and Brown asked Thurston where he had heard this story, and 
Thurston replied that the merchant Peter Appleyard was refusing to take shillings at his stall. 
The bailiff William Skyrwyck spoke to Appleyard, who replied that Lyttellwood had told him 
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that he had heard in Norwich that shillings should go for a groat. Lyttellwood claimed that he 
had heard the rumour from a colleague named Jennor. Jennor confessed that he had passed on 
the rumour, but claimed to have heard it originally from Richard Banges. Banges denied 
spreading the rumour and said he heard it from Appleyard. Appleyard admitted he had heard 
the rumour at Walsham market from a woman who he refused to name. John Joyner then 
claimed that he had been helping Lyttellwood
 
fold up cloth at his stall when Banges came up 
and ‘bidde him’ to put away his shillings because they were worth ‘but groots a pece’. 
Lyttellwood recalled that Banges had approached Joyner and ‘pluck[ed] him by his sleve’ 
and ‘then ded talke to him pryvily’ and told him that shillings were worth 4d. Joyner then told 
Lyttellwood
 
 what Banges had said – and here the investigation ended, with no resolution in 
sight.
63
  
Those individuals who were found guilty of spreading rumours were publicly 
punished. One woman in Norfolk who was reported to have declared openly that ‘a shilling 
shuld goo for a groate’ was placed in a cage in the marketplace.64 A week later, John Jackson 
of St John Maddermarket was placed in a cage with a paper on his breast for claiming that ‘a 
shilling would be a groat’.65 In February 1552, the Privy Council instructed the mayor of 
Bedford to put John Wyar on the pillory ‘for raising of a brute towching a new fall of demi 
Shillinges’; and Nicholas Rowte was ‘enprisoned for certain lewde woordes spoken by hym 
abowt the utteraunce of six pence’. Rowte was set on the pillory in the marketplace and had 
one of his ears cut off.
66
 In March 1552 a servant, George Harris, was arrested for ‘reporting 
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certain rumours of the fall of Mony’; and in January 1553 one ‘Wylde’ was committed to the 
Marshalsea for uttering ‘sedicious words touching the Kinges Majesties coyne’.67  
Despite these punitive measures, rumours about coins continued to circulate. In 
September 1551, the Imperial Ambassador Jehan Sheyfve reported that there had been 
attempts at insurrection at Reading and Wales, prompted by rumours about the debased 
coinage.
68
 In September 1556, the citizen Henry Machyn noted there was ‘a grett rumor in 
London abowtte stesturns [testons] in Chepe, Belynggatt, Leydynhalle, Nuwgatt markett, 
amonge markett folke and meyllmen, by [naughty] parsuns’; as a result, he continued, ‘my 
lord mayre and the ij Shreyffes was fayne to go in-to the marketts for (to) sett pepull in a 
stay’.69 The Privy Council sent a letter to the Mayor of London instructing him to send 
‘espialls’ into the city ‘for thapprehension of suche as refuse to receive testurnes and other 
currant money … for their wares’,70 and a royal proclamation was issued setting out 
punishments for those who spread ‘rumours of the decrying or fall of the coin or moneys 
commonly called testons’.71 However, despite these measures, the Venetian Ambassador 
reported that the English government had ‘not yet made the expected demonstration to 
remove the general suspicion about the depreciation of the coinage, the fear of which has so 
increased both here and in the country’.72 People simply did not trust the assurances in royal 
proclamations, especially when these statements ran counter to prevailing opinion. 
We can see a contrast here between the official discourse on the coinage, as set out in 
royal proclamations and government correspondence, and an unofficial discourse formed of 
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rumour, gossip, and popular report. Proclamations about devaluations sparked rumours, and 
these rumours in turn elicited further proclamations in response. The government reacted 
strongly to rumours because they threatened to impinge on a matter of state; in theory, the 
crown retained the sole right to fix and determine the value of coins in the realm, and 
rumours and criticisms of the coinage threatened to destabilise that power. As David Rollison 
has observed, although the monarch may in theory have the right to alter the value of the 
coinage, what really matters in practice ‘is not what the king intends, but what the community 
thinks what he says and does mean, and whether, in all the innumerable activities they engage 
in, they comply with his theory’.73 In the case of mid-Tudor England, popular reluctance to 
accept coins at their face value represented a direct challenge to the authority of the crown, 
demonstrating that the monarch’s stamp on a coin was less important than its practical 
exchange value.  
This interplay between official and unofficial discourses on the coinage is dealt with 
in the play Respublica, written at Queen Mary’s accession to the throne in 1553, and 
attributed to Nicholas Udall.
74
 In Respublica the character ‘People’ tells the character 
‘Respublica’ about some of the social and economic ills of England. One of these is the 
debased coinage. ‘People’ complains that ‘Zix pence in eche shilling was I-strike quite awaie, 
zo vor one piece iche tooke, che was vaine to paie… twaie’. The character ‘Oppression’ 
confirms that ‘[t]he coigne eke is changed … Yea from silver to drosse’.75 ‘Respublica’ is 
initially troubled by these complaints, saying ‘I lamente yt, People. Alac, what maie I doe? I 
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miselfe, I feare, shall come to ruine toe’. However, ‘Respublica’ is then counselled by the 
character ‘Avarice’, who denounces the opinions of ‘People’ and advises ‘Respublica’ to 
ignore their complaints: ‘[b]utt rude Peples wordes will ye geve credyte vnto? will ye iudge 
yourself after his foolish [iangling?] ye wer well enough tyll he begonne his wrangling’. The 
character ‘Insolence’ supports ‘Avarice’, adding: ‘will ye beleve People that hath no manier 
of skill to iudge or to descerne what thing is good or yll?’76  
As Adam Fox has noted, ‘People’ speaks in a ‘stylised literary dialect intended to 
represent the language of humble provincial folk’; the comments that ‘People’ makes about 
the coinage are therefore presented as part of a popular discourse spoken by ordinary 
people.
77
 The dialogue in Respublica suggests that the people’s complaints had normally 
been dismissed by the governors of the commonwealth as no more than ill-informed 
‘wrangling’ and ‘iangling’, thus highlighting the lack of ‘credyte’ that was given to popular 
discourse on the coinage. Respublica shows that the opinions of the people are ostensibly 
ignored because they are perceived to lack the necessary ‘skill’ and discernment to 
understand the reasoning behind economic and monetary policy, and they have no legitimate 
voice in a matter of state. But by placing these arguments in the mouths of characters named 
‘Insolence’ and ‘Avarice’, the play in fact critiques these assumptions and urges ‘Respublica’ 
to pay attention to ‘People’ whose complaints are in fact valid and important.  
Respublica illustrates how control over the coinage was closely linked with the 
control of language in the mid-sixteenth century. As Kirk M. Fabel has argued, the ‘linguistic 
economy’ of laws, statutes and proclamations in early modern England was threatened by 
‘traffickers in rumour’, whose words ‘undermined the authority of the coin’ and hence the 
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authority of the crown.
78
 This connection was also made by contemporaries, who recognised 
that rumours about the coinage had a direct impact on state authority. In 1570, the Privy 
Council noted that a rumour had been spreading in Wales about a devaluation of the 
currency. The Council wrote that this rumour had been devised by ‘maliciouse personnes to 
move the people to disquiett and to a myslyking of the present state and government’, and 
moved swiftly to counter the rumour so that ‘her Majesties subjectes may have this scruple 
removed out of their heades as much as may be’.79 The government realised the importance 
of shaping popular opinion – or monitoring the contents of peoples ‘heades’ – and the 
coinage was understood to be a politically sensitive issue that could easily cause people to 
‘myslyke’ the ‘state and government’ of the realm. 
 
* 
 
The debased coins were not the only cause for concern in the mid-sixteenth century. There 
were also rumours about other kinds of ‘false’ or untrustworthy coins in circulation, 
particularly counterfeit and foreign coins.
80
 Discussions of these coins followed a similar 
pattern to that described above: popular rumours arose alongside and in reaction to royal 
proclamations and official announcements, and the proliferation of these statements only 
added to the general confusion among ordinary people as to which kinds of coins were legal 
currency, and how much they were worth. When considering the issue of the coinage in mid-
                                                          
78
 Fabel, ‘Questions of numismatic and linguistic signification’, p. 242. 
79
 APC, vii. 378. 
80
 Studies of early modern counterfeiting have not yet focused on the mid-sixteenth-century debasement. For the 
later Tudor period onwards see M. Gaskill, Crime and mentalities in early modern England (Cambridge, 2000), 
pp. 123-202. For the seventeenth century see C. Wennerlind, ‘Credit-money as the philosopher's stone: alchemy 
and the coinage problem in seventeenth-century England’, History of Political Economy, annual supplement to 
vol. 35 (2003), pp. 234-261. For general surveys see A. Macfarlane and S. Harrison, The justice and the mare’s 
ale: law and disorder in seventeenth-century England (Oxford, 1981), pp. 61-78; W. Fisher, ‘Queer money’, 
English Literary History, vol. 66, no. 1 (1999), pp. 1-23 
24 
 
Tudor England, it is important to recognise that the debasement was not the only problem 
identified by contemporaries; rather, it was seen as one of many interconnected problems that 
together made the currency unstable and unreliable.  
Counterfeiting and the circulation of false, clipped, or damaged coins was a problem 
throughout the early modern period. Concerns about these practices were especially 
heightened during periods of debasement, as it was believed by many contemporaries that the 
falling quality of official the coinage presented greater opportunities for currency crime. Base 
coins were easier to forge, because they were of poorer quality to begin with; this meant that 
counterfeit coins were both easier and cheaper to make, and harder to detect once they were 
in circulation. A royal proclamation of 1549 acknowledged this problem, noting that the 
debased coins offered a particular ‘greatness and facility of counterfeiting’, a situation which 
had given ‘occasion to divers evil persons to stamp or cast pieces of the same form’.81  
Challis has argued that, based on surviving material evidence, counterfeiting was 
probably not ‘a serious problem throughout the Tudor period’.82 However, it is important to 
recognise that it was perceived as such by contemporaries, and this was especially the case 
during the latter stages of the debasement, when the scale of counterfeiting was repeatedly 
emphasised by the government. In 1548, a royal proclamation announced that coins were 
being counterfeited ‘in great multitude’ by ‘divers evil persons’; and a year later it was 
proclaimed that coins were still being counterfeited in a ‘great multitude’.83 A proclamation 
of 1551 warned that ‘counterfeit and false moneys’ were being produced and circulated ‘in 
great and notable sums’; and in 1556 it was announced that ‘a great quantity of forged and 
counterfeit coins’ were being produced ‘daily’.84 The problem of counterfeiting therefore 
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needs to be analysed not only in terms of what was actually happening, but in terms of what 
was thought – or what was said – to be happening.  
It is likely that the repeated condemnation of currency crimes in royal proclamations 
was in part a strategy to deflect attention away from the damage caused to the coinage by 
debasement. In this way, the decayed condition of the national coinage could be blamed on 
the illicit activities of counterfeiters and other ‘naughty persons’, rather than being attributed 
to government policy. As Jérôme Blanc has suggested, ‘the controversial debate on the royal 
ability to debase the currency can be hidden by a general and unanimous denunciation’ of 
counterfeiting, ‘thus formally lessening the sovereign’s responsibility’ for the condition of the 
coinage.
85
 In this sense, the government’s repeated warnings about counterfeit coins could 
have been intended to conceal the wider problems caused by the monetary manipulations 
authorised by the crown and carried out in the mints.  
This connection was recognised by early modern commentators, who suggested that 
the government’s policy of debasement was counterfeiting in all but name.86 In 1551 Daniel 
Barbaro, the Venetian ambassador to England, observed that English mint officials had ‘well 
nigh come to coin false money, plating copper with silver’.87 In A Shorte Treatise of Politike 
Power (1556), John Ponet criticised those governors who had ‘countrefaicte[d] the coine … 
turning the substance from golde to copper, from siluer to worse then pewter’.88 In his treatise 
on the coinage of 1553, John Pryse also criticised the debasement because it involved the 
same kind of deception as counterfeiting. He suggested that ‘albeit base coin of coarse metal 
hath for a season sometime been reputed as good as fine silver, that was like as a man that 
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taketh a counterfeit groat as good as a true, or a counterfeit diamond for a true, till he know it, 
and then esteemeth it as it is worthy’.89 Given the blurring of the lines between debasement 
and counterfeiting, the language used in royal proclamations and legislation needed to make a 
clear distinction between authorised and unauthorised coining practices. The government 
argued that its own manipulations of the coinage constituted part of a long-term programme 
for economic reform, whereas counterfeiters had no such concerns for the wellbeing of the 
realm. They were described as ‘evil’, ‘false’, and ‘naughty’ persons whose actions placed 
them outside of the moral economy of the commonwealth.  
Counterfeiting was classed as treason by a statute of 1351, and subsequent statutes 
and proclamations had extended legislation to criminalise practices such as clipping, filing, 
and sweating coins.
90
 In 1561, it was announced that a ‘traytor by the common lawe, is 
properly, he that doth counterfeyte and make false money, or doth clyppe the Quenes coyne, 
wasshers or demynyshers of the same coine or any other lawful coine’.91 Counterfeiting was 
a treasonous offence, and convicted coiners faced severe punishments: men could be hanged, 
drawn, and quartered, and women sentenced to burn to death. In 1546, Charles Wriothesley 
observed that William Harpin, an alebrewer convicted of counterfeiting testons, was ‘drawen 
from Newgate to the Towre Hill and their hanged’.92 Henry Machyn also witnessed several 
punishments for coining: in 1554 he noted that two men were ‘dran of ij hyrdles unto 
Tyburne and un-to hanging … for qwnnyng of noythy [naughty] money’, and in 1555 he 
observed that three more men were taken to Tyborne to be hanged ‘for qwynnyng of 
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money’.93 In 1558, he recorded that a group of coiners from Cambridge were taken to 
Westminster for trial, and three men and one woman ‘cared to the Towre for kuynnyng’.94 
In addition to arrests and punishments, other strategies to prevent counterfeiting were 
introduced. In 1556 a royal proclamation outlined new measures designed to put 
‘counterfeiters and other naughty persons in fear’. This instructed that no one should accept 
any coins without first weighing them, or otherwise testing ‘the goodness thereof’. If the 
coins were found to be false, then the receiver was to ‘immediately deface or cause to be 
defaced, and break or cause to be broken in pieces, every such counterfeit coin and coins’.95 
As Stephen Deng has suggested, this served a dual purpose. The primary aim was to take 
counterfeit coins out of circulation and render them unusable as currency; but the action of 
cutting coins into pieces also mirrored the corporal punishment for counterfeiters, who were 
condemned to be hanged, drawn, and quartered. The act of breaking counterfeit coins thus 
‘entailed a symbolic violence that rehearsed the ensuing physical violence … against those 
who produced these coins’.96 By placing the responsibility for detecting counterfeit coins in 
the hands of the people, rather than the state, this proclamation also suggested that control of 
the coinage was a public concern and should be policed by all members of society.  
Proclamations against counterfeiting often cited foreigners as among the chief 
perpetrators of currency crimes. In 1548, it was announced that counterfeiters ‘for the most 
part have been strangers dwelling in foreign parts who have found the means to convey 
privily and disperse the said counterfeit pieces’ in England.97 A proclamation of 1549 stated 
that ‘sundry persons, in the parts beyond the seas, have now of late attempted to counterfeit 
… testons, shillings, groats, and other … coins of silver, and in great multitude do privily 
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bring them into this realm’; and in 1556 it was announced that false coins were still being 
‘counterfeit, forged, and brought into their … majesties’ realm by divers naughty and evil-
disposed persons’.98  
The problem of foreign counterfeiting was also raised in contemporary texts. The 
anonymous author of ‘Policies to reduce this realme of Englande vnto a prosperus wealthe 
and estate’ (1549) described how counterfeit coins were being manufactured abroad and 
transported into England. The writer warned the government that they ‘shoulde not herin be 
over negligent’ in assuming that these coins could be detected. The foreigners were so 
‘conningge’, it was claimed, that ‘they will not mise one Jotte neyther … in the Stampe, nor 
in the Blanching’ of coins; as a result, ‘ther cane be no kinde of Differaunce perceived 
betweine our coyne and the counterfeit’.99 The author of Pyers plowmans exhortation (1550) 
likewise observed that foreigners ‘do counterfayte our new coyned siluer beyond the seas’, 
and recommended that ‘good prouision and narrowe search be made that none of the sayde 
counterfayted money be connuayed hither’.100 Thomas Smith mentioned the dangers of 
foreign counterfeiting in his Discourse, in which the Doctor warns that ‘strangers haue 
conterfeted oure coine, and founde the meanes to haue greate masses transported hither and 
heare vttered it’.101 The Doctor then outlines several ways by which strangers could smuggle 
counterfeit coins past searchers at English ports, including ‘puttinge the saide coine in theire 
ships balast, or in some vesselles of [wyne], or other liquor’.102 
Although these fears may have been exaggerated, they were not entirely unfounded, 
and a number of people were arrested for bringing counterfeit coins to England from 
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overseas. In 1556, the English merchant Henry Savell was arrested for ‘introducing’ 66 half 
sovereigns and English crowns that had been ‘falsely counterfeited at Rone and Depe in parts 
beyond seas’,103 and the merchant Thomas Androwes was accused of ‘bryngyng or 
convaying from the parties beyond the Sea into this Realme of Englande… false and 
counterfett money’ in his ship. In his defence, Androwes maintained that ‘the said counterfett 
money was freghted and laden in the said ship by other persons’ and not by him.104 
Warnings about the influx of counterfeit coins from overseas echoed more general 
concerns about the circulation of foreign specie in England.
105
 As Deng has noted, foreign 
coins were often represented as alien bodies infiltrating the larger ‘body politic’ of the nation, 
causing corruption and decay to the commonwealth. This was especially the case for 
counterfeit foreign coins, which in any case were not legal tender, but it was also true of 
‘good’ foreign coins which might also be perceived to ‘possess a corrupting influence’.106 
Suspicion of foreign coins ranged from the large-scale (they might be used to fund subversive 
plots against the crown) to the quotidian (they might confuse everyday monetary 
transactions). For many early modern commentators, foreign coins and counterfeit coins were 
often synonymous: both were seen to represent a threat to the body politic and a challenge to 
the authority of the English crown as controller of currency in the realm. 
Although the circulation of foreign coins was not perceived to be as serious a problem 
as debasement or counterfeiting, it received attention from early modern writers. As with the 
debasement, most texts were addressed to government officials and presented in the form of 
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advice rather than overt criticism of monetary policy. William Cecil was closely involved 
with the coinage in Elizabeth I’s reign, and he received several warnings about the problems 
caused by the circulation of foreign currency in England. In 1560, the mercer William Burd 
wrote to Cecil informing him that ‘basse’ pistolet coins were being introduced from overseas 
and uttered as if they were fine; this ‘practyz’, he said, brought a ‘gayne’ to ‘the stranger’, 
and resulted in ‘the gret hvrtt of the realme’.107 Burd warned that these coins did not ‘only 
deseve the mvltytewd and symple peple but also very wysse men and men of knowlage in 
metells’ because they were ‘so artyfycialy made’; he therefore advised that foreign coins 
should not be used as currency at all, but taken straight to the mints and melted down.
108
 
Other experts offered similar opinions. In 1565 William Humphrey, Assay Master of the 
Royal Mint, wrote to the Duke of Norfolk that ‘flemysh angells comyth still ouer in great 
sums ... and I think dysperced in to all quarters of the Reallme’. He explained that although 
these coins were only worth seven shillings, they were commonly taken for ten shillings in 
‘the Cuntrey’ because of ‘the ignorance of the comon people’. This led to rumours and 
confusion, as ‘many thinketh that the said angells ar set foorthe by the Queen’; and 
Humphrey warned that there were fears ‘her highnes will embace her monyes agayne’.109  
Humphrey’s letter highlights one of the major problems with the circulation of foreign 
coins in England, which was that most people were not familiar with foreign money, and so 
often could not distinguish between real and counterfeit pieces, or between one type of coin 
and another. Much of the suspicion surrounding foreign coins stemmed from such confusion. 
In an attempt to clarify the situation, several royal proclamations were issued describing 
which foreign coins were current in England, how much they were worth, and how they 
might be identified. In 1560, 1561, and 1565, proclamations were published with printed 
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pictures of foreign coins designed to help people recognise those pieces that were acceptable 
as current money.
110
 English subjects were urged to ‘take diligent heed and regard to these 
manner of notable deceits intended by evil disposed persons in utterance of ... foreign 
coins’.111 The language here directly mirrors that used to describe the circulation of 
counterfeit coins: both are perpetuated by ‘evil’ persons intent on causing ‘deceit’ and 
damage to the commonwealth.  
Counterfeit and foreign coins were perceived to be ‘false money’ because they 
undermined the authority of the monarch’s stamp on the coin, and threatened the crown’s 
sole right to coin legal money in the realm. Through making repeated statements about 
counterfeiters and foreign coiners in royal proclamations, and the introduction of new 
legislation against illicit coining, the government claimed to be protecting the commonwealth 
against the real dangers posed by currency crimes: and, in so doing, perhaps hoped to deflect 
attention away from the damage caused by debasement. But these issues could never be 
entirely separated, and the spotlight placed by the government on counterfeit and foreign 
coins only served to exacerbate existing confusion about the debased coinage. For many 
commentators, it was only easy to conflate the actions of the government with those 
‘naughty’ coiners and forgers who they so loudly condemned.  
 
* 
When Elizabeth I came to the throne in 1558, one of the first issues that her government 
addressed was the reformation of the coinage.
112
 The task was not only to reform the material 
content of the currency, but also to restore confidence in the coinage as a medium of 
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exchange: Elizabeth and her government recognised that they had to address the matter of 
public opinion. They employed similar tactics to previous regimes, publishing royal 
proclamations, enforcing punishments for rumour-mongers and counterfeiters, and repeatedly 
emphasising their good intention to restore the coinage to a fine standard. But the Elizabethan 
government also introduced some new tactics in an attempt to reduce confusion and explain 
to ordinary people which coins were current, what they were worth, and how they could best 
be identified.  
As one of the worst affected coins during the debasement period, the testons posed an 
immediate problem for the new regime. Because some testons in circulation were baser than 
others, it was decided that they would be given two different rates, with the ‘worse’ sort 
valued at 2¼ pence, and the ‘better’ sort at 4½ pence. A proclamation was issued in 
September 1560 telling people how to differentiate between the baser and the better testons. 
The base coins could be recognised by a distinguishing mark: either a fleur de lis, a rose, a 
lion, or a harp. Illustrations of these marks were published in the proclamation, with an 
accompanying text explaining that these pictures had been circulated ‘to thintent that euery 
person loking and beholding the same printes, maye the better iudge and discrerne the 
same’.113 As another aid to help people identify the ‘worser’ coins, the proclamation also 
explained that ‘the colour of the sayde base Teston wyll shewe the basenes thereof’ – that is, 
the high proportion of copper in the coins would make them appear reddish or brassy in 
colour, whereas the ‘better’ coins would have a more silvery appearance.114 
 [Fig. 1] 
Although these printed images and the accompanying advice were intended to provide 
people with useful information, in practice they did little to dispel existing confusion and may 
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even have exacerbated it. The diarist Henry Machyn, for instance, although he dutifully noted 
the new proclamation in his journal, could only remember three out of the four distinguishing 
marks.
115
 As the Privy Council had acknowledged in 1551, many coins being issued from the 
mints were so ‘disfigured’ that they were almost unidentifiable as legal tender; given this, it 
would have been difficult to decipher a small mark such as a fleur de lis or rose. To further 
add to the confusion, the information that the royal proclamations contained was technically 
wrong; the testons described as having a ‘harp’ stamp were actually marked with a ‘Y’ and 
not a harp at all.  
By October 1560, it was clear that there was still a large amount of confusion 
surrounding the testons. A further proclamation was issued observing that ‘much trouble and 
disquiet ariseth … for discerning and knowing of the basest testons … although much is set 
forth in words ... as can be to teach the same both by marks and by colour, and of late also 
setting forth in print the prints and stamps of the said testons’.116 Alternative methods of 
identification were suggested, although none were entirely successful. The Marquis of 
Winchester wrote to Cecil suggesting his own method for distinguishing between the better 
and worser sorts of testons: ‘in the good teston the ymage of the king hathe a short necke and 
a round face and in the ill teston the prince hathe a long necke and a leane face, which I take 
to be as good a knowledge as any marke’.117  
The government next announced that all testons would be countermarked in order to 
clearly show their current value. The better testons would be stamped with the mark of a 
portcullis; and the base testons would be stamped with a greyhound.
118
 Instead of instructing 
people to bring their testons to the mints to be countermarked, a new scheme was introduced 
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to carry out the stamping in public. This was likely to have been a response to the widespread 
mistrust of mints and mint officials during the debasement period. Rumours such as the story 
of the ‘strange coin’ produced in the ‘secret mint’ at Dudley Castle stemmed in part from the 
opacity of the minting process, which prompted suspicions about conspiracies and corruption. 
Many contemporaries suspected that the mints were being manipulated for the personal profit 
and political advantage of individual governors. In 1554, the Italian Giacomo Soranzo, an 
ambassador to Edward VI and Queen Mary, wrote to the Venetian Senate reporting a popular 
rumour that ‘the great personages’ in England had ‘agreed together’ to make ‘a coinage for 
their own personal benefit’, and were using the royal mints for this secret purpose.119 These 
kinds of rumours were exacerbated by high-profile cases of mint fraud, such as William 
Sharington’s removal from the Bristol Mint after his involvement in a counterfeiting scandal 
linked with a plot to overthrow Protector Somerset.
120
   
Similar suspicions were echoed in contemporary literature. In Thomas More’s Utopia, 
it is suggested that ‘yf thies metalles [gold and silver] … shoulde be fast locked vp in some 
tower, it myghte be suspected that the prynce and the cowncell, as the people is euer 
foolyshelye ymagininge … intended by some subtyltye to deceaue the commons, and to take 
some proffette … to themselfes’.121 The English translation of Utopia was first published in 
1551, with a second edition in 1556; both these years saw a proliferation of rumours about 
the coinage accompanied by the threat of riots and unrest. A suspicion of mint officials is also 
articulated in Thomas Smith’s Discourse, in which the Doctor suggests that English mint 
masters had deliberately deceived the king by turning the debasement to their own advantage. 
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They ‘doe what deceipt they lust’, the Doctor warns, and use the mints ‘for theire owne 
lucre’.122 Because the coinage had become so ‘confused’ during the debasement, the Doctor 
warned that the activities of the mint officials could not easily be regulated, and they were 
taking full advantage of this: ‘thoughe they perswade the prince that the gaines of all that 
comes to his grace, yet the most gaynes cleavethe by theire owne fingers. And whie? Because 
the proportion in these confused metalles is so vncerteyne to be knowen ... as the kinges 
officers can not evenly charge theim to kepe a certaine standard’.123 The coiners in the Royal 
Mints had been able to deceive the crown and produce false money precisely because their 
activities were carried out in secret. 
The Elizabethan government attempted to dispel these kinds of suspicions by 
introducing a new policy of stamping coins outside the mints. Letters were sent from the 
Queen to the mayors of towns throughout the country with instructions about how to perform 
the countermarking of testons.
124
 First, two stamping irons (one of a greyhound and one of a 
portcullis) would be sent to the mayor in a sealed bag. This would be opened by the mayor in 
the presence of a local JP and a group of trusted citizens. These men would then sit in an 
‘open place’ between nine in the morning and three in the afternoon – in London, this was 
done in the livery company halls – and people would bring their testons to this place to be 
assessed and stamped.
125
 The stamping itself would be carried out by a local goldsmith, ‘of 
the best knowledg in the matter that ye can gett’, whose job was to ascertain the value of the 
testons and mark them accordingly. The mayors were instructed to ‘sweare the Goldsmyth’ 
charged with stamping the coins ‘to judg and discern trewly betwixt the one moneys and the 
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other to the uttermost of his knowledg’; and if he was not sure of the value, or suspected that 
the teston was a counterfeit, then the coin was to be left unstamped and taken to the mint.
126
  
 [Figs. 2 and 3] 
Stamping took place in a number of towns, but there was a mixed reaction to the 
scheme. In some cases, the plan seems to have worked relatively smoothly. In Norwich, the 
city council received letters of instruction from the Queen on 28 October 1560, along with 
four stamps (‘too of the grayhounde and too of the parcullys’) and one ‘Rounde peace of 
Iron’ to place the testons on.127 In other places, however, there were problems putting the 
plan into action. Sir Francis Leek wrote to Cecil warning him that there were some doubts 
among the governors at Berwick who were uncertain how to distinguish between the two 
kinds of testons. He requested that a London goldsmith be sent up to Berwick as soon as 
possible, ‘to devyde the same testons, thone from thother’.128 In early October 1560, the 
Marquis of Winchester wrote to Cecil confirming that he would forward a set of stamping 
irons, proclamations, and instructions from the Queen to Berwick, but he cautioned that these 
would still not be sufficient to persuade people to take testons as current money.
129
  
In Exeter, the coining stamps did not arrive for some weeks after the policy was 
announced, and rumours began to circulate in the interim period. Sir Peter Carew and 
Thomas Williams wrote to the Earl of Bedford explaining that ‘it is bruted ... that the 
stampers ... reiect a greate number of bothe sortes of testons for counterfaytes, so that they 
nowe vtterly refuse to receave any beinge vnstampt not knowinge, as they saie, the 
counterfayte frome the good’. They urged the Privy Council to send the stamping irons as 
soon as possible, considering ‘whate inconvenyence maye growe by the wante of the same 
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here, that elswhere putteth the people in some quyet’.130 There were also problems in 
Leicester, where the testons stamped with a greyhound were refused as currency. In 
November 1560, the Earl of Huntingdon wrote to Cecil describing ‘what inconuenyence 
heare ys groune emongest the people for too pens farthynge euerye bodye ys loathe to take 
theym’.131 A similar situation arose in York, where people refused to accept the ‘worse’ 
testons as currency. The Council in the North complained that ‘the moste troble that hathe 
byn of late ... is concerninge the baseste sorte of testons’, and urged the Queen to set out a 
new proclamation to calm these concerns: ‘yt wold in our openyons muche quyete the 
greatest number of your Subiectes in thies partes of your Realme; beinge so farre distante 
frome London’.132 In December 1560 Sir Thomas Gargrave wrote to Cecil warning him that 
the people of York ‘be in good hett, sauyng the troble they fynd in the base sorte of moneys’; 
he suggested that if a mint were established in York, this ‘wold fully quyett the people, and 
esspecyally the grett nomber of the pore and ignorant as handycraftes men pore husbandmen 
and laborers’.133  
Although stamping had taken place in Norwich, there were problems afterwards when 
people refused to accept the base testons as legal tender. Thomas Narford, a beer brewer, was 
set ‘nexte vnto the pyllory with a paper on his hed for Refusing the Quenes coynes’; and 
William Raynoldes was sent to prison for telling his wife ‘that she shoulde receyue no coyne 
and money that was coyned the Tyme of king Phillip and Quene Mary’.134 One of Narford’s 
servants was also punished for the same offence.
135
 In London people were also unwilling to 
accept base testons. Henry Machyn recorded that a special measure that was introduced to 
combat this problem. The Mayor of London instructed representatives from the livery 
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companies to ‘walke in evere markett, with a whyt rod in ther handes, to loke that men shuld 
take testons ... as the quen has proclamyd in all markettes thrughe all London, that the 
markett folke take the money, because the rumore rane that they shuld falle’.136  
Although the scheme of stamping testons was not entirely successful, the Elizabethan 
regime did manage to thoroughly overhaul the coinage in the early 1560s. Most of the work 
was carried out by a group of coiners from Antwerp.
137
 It was generally thought that the 
foreigners offered a better deal for reforming the coinage than the English mint workers were 
able to do; Sir John Yorke, former under-treasurer of the Royal Mint at Southwark, wrote to 
Cecil in October 1560 that, by his calculations, ‘the strangers will saue twenty thowsande 
pounds at the least in refining that our [English] fyners can not doe’.138 This is an inversion of 
the concerns about foreign coiners described above. Whereas foreign counterfeiters were 
feared precisely because of their superior skill in producing coins that were better than any 
English expert could detect, for the purposes of the recoinage this superior skill was 
deliberately harnessed by the crown for the benefit of the commonwealth. 
Some English mint workers complained that the contract for the recoinage should not 
have been given away to foreigners. Thomas Stanley, comptroller of the Royal Mint, told 
Cecil that the English refiners were upset that they had been overlooked: ‘it greveth them 
muche’ to be told that ‘straungers shulde do it better chape then thaye’. Stanley’s own 
opinion, however, was that ‘for anye thinge that I haue seane as yet, yf the stranger will doo it 
… it shalbe a good bargayne for the quenes majestie, and better then we shalbe able to doo it 
in the mynte’.139 In December 1560 Peter Osborne, an officer in the Exchequer, wrote to the 
Queen offering to refine ‘our base moneys’ at a cheaper rate ‘than the almaynes … in the 
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towre haue covenanted to do’.140 Osborne did receive a contract, but overall the foreigners 
remained the chief actors in the recoinage: Challis has estimated that they refined about 83 
per cent, with English mint workers making up the rest.
141
  
In July 1561 the Queen made a special visit to the Royal Mint as part of the publicity 
for the recoinage, where she was given ‘serten pesses of gold’ to commemorate her visit.142 A 
special medal was struck with a portrait of Elizabeth on one face and a seated figure of 
Justice on the other. This formed part of a programme to publicise the recoinage and, in so 
doing, to restore the good reputation of the English currency. The recoinage was praised by 
contemporaries as one of the great achievements of Elizabeth’s reign. James Pilkington wrote 
in 1563 that Elizabeth had succeeded in ‘restoringe vs a fine coine from so base’, a cause for 
‘wise men’ to ‘reioise’;143 and Raphael Holinshed noted in his Chronicle (1577) that ‘our 
most gracious Quéene, and souereigne Princes, did finish the matter wholly, vtterly 
abolishing the vse of copper Coine, and conuerting the same into fine Syluer’.144 A royal 
proclamation of June 1561 announced that the Queen had ‘achieved to the victory and 
conquest of this hideous monster of the base moneys, which … hath … been in part no small 
occasion of many evils’ in the realm.145 
For Elizabeth to have succeeded in conquering the ‘hideous monster’ of the base 
money, she had also had to contend with the ‘many headed monster’ of popular opinion, 
rumour, criticism, and unrest. To do so, she explicitly linked the introduction of a good 
currency with the wider ‘reformation’ of the commonwealth under her rule; and she 
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recognised the importance of using these kinds of statements in royal proclamations. In this 
sense, through a combination of reforming the coinage materially and also working to change 
the dominant discourse and language surrounding it, Elizabeth arguably understood and 
managed the ‘delicate relationship between image, spin and public perception’ better than her 
predecessors.
146
 
The reformation of the coinage in the early 1560s was not just a material task or even 
an economic one, bur was a much broader challenge that contemporaries understood to be 
comparable to the reformation of religion in its scale and impact. The state had to fix the 
value of specie, reform abuses and misuses of the currency, and present an authoritative and 
‘believable’ version of monetary policy in order restore public trust in the coinage and 
reassert the authority of the monarch’s stamp on the coins. These problems were not, of 
course, confined to the mid-sixteenth century; and the Elizabethan regime faced difficulties 
with the coinage in future years. But the discussions and policies of this period were, in their 
particular configuration, unique, and as such their interaction shed new light on the broad 
political implications of the way people spoke about, represented, and used money in early 
modern England.  
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Fig. 1: Prints of the base testons showing their distinguishing marks.
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Fig. 2: Edward VI teston stamped with portcullis countermark (1560). Courtesy of Spink and 
Son, London
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Fig. 3: Edward VI teston stamped with seated greyhound countermark (1560). Courtesy of 
Spink and Son, London
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